




Text is inherently ambiguous. Yet investors read textual news as the primary
source of financial information from the financial news and social media. I used Nat-
ural Language Processing on social and financial media text to construct a natural
event and Big Data ambiguity measurement. The ambiguity measurement is derived
from a mixture of distributions model that distinguishes from disagreement between
the two sources. A binomial model based on smooth ambiguity preferences is then
proposed that explains salient points of ambiguity on asset pricing in empirical tests
in this paper and in Brenner and Izhakian (2018). The paper finds that the financial
news media have a bigger influence on asset prices than social media except during
the last recession from Jun 2009 to Nov 2016. The paper provides a market-wide and
natural event evidence of agents’ maxmin utility optimisation behavior in Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989).
Keywords: Social media, mixture of distributions, natural language processing, am-
biguity aversion, disagreement
JEL Code: D10, D12, G40, G41
∗eric.tham@edhec.com, Edhec Business School & National University of Singapore. The author will
like to thank Laurent Calvet and Abraham Loiui for their guidance and encouragement, and also to Raman
Uppal and Kim Peijnenburg for their helpful comments. He also thanks Richard L. Peterson for access to
Thomson Reuters data. All errors are solely mine.
1
1 Introduction
Technology has impacted how investors receive information and make decisions in the fi-
nancial markets. This information can be categorised into tangible and intangible news as
in Daniel and Titman (2006). Both impact the markets. The news media is a propagator of
largely intangible news which is information aside from the quantifiable macro-economic
and company fundamentals. Intangible news includes public news and rumours about
the company in the form of text. The use of Internet and social media especially amongst
the retail investors has particularly democratised the dissemination of information and
also increased its speed of transmission. This is especially true for the avid millennial and
Gen Z generation users. This raises key questions - how do investors process such in-
formation in the midst of diverse information sources and frequently ambiguous textual
news?
This is especially important since the popular use of social media from the late 1990s.
An increasing number of Americans are turning to the social media as a source of in-
formation.1 Social media seeks to level the playing field for the household investors by
improving financial literacy and lowering the costs of household participation. This helps
to enhance their social welfare by participation in the stock markets. Yet notably the In-
ternet and the social media is a ’free for all’ where views expressed could be misleading
or fake. Its information quality can be ambiguous and suspect.2
This paper proposes a Natural event and Big Data ambiguity3 measurement from
Natural Language Processing4 of millions of Internet posts. These posts provide a nat-
ural platform for the opinion scores reflecting the views and beliefs of investors. I use a
1This Pew centre article shows that social media use amongst Americans increased from 5% of the pop-
ulation in 2005 to almost 70% in 2018.
2About two-thirds of Americans get news on social media but most do not trust the news there as
accurate - Pew article on 18 Sep 2018.
3In this paper, ambiguity and uncertainty are used interchangeably as referring to Knight’s classic work
in the 1930s while risk follows the Keynesian definition much described in literature.
4Natural Language Processing is the computational quantification of large amounts of textual data into
a structured format for analysis.
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mixture of distributions model to aggregate the opinion scores from two primary infor-
mation sources - the financial news and social media texts on the S&P 500 index to build
an ambiguity measurement. This measurement derives the first moment by a mixing pa-
rameter weighted average of the opinion scores and the second moment as the ambiguity
itself. This ambiguity is distinct from the disagreement between the two opinion scores
although they are positively related. Regression tests are then performed on these ambi-
guity measurements to quantify which of the information sources is more important. My
results indicate the greater importance of the financial news media source since Jan 1998.
My results also report broad empirical evidence of the investors’ maxmin behaviour that
is cited in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) that reflects conservative beliefs under ambigu-
ity. This contributed to the greater importance of the social media post the Lehman crisis
from Jun 2009 to Nov 2016 due to its more pessimistic tone.
I further develop a simple binomial tree model of ambiguity that explains the salient
features of ambiguity on asset pricing based on the smooth ambiguity model of Kilbanoff
et al. (2005). The model predictions are consistent with the empirical findings in this
paper and also in Brenner and Izhakian (2018). Notably, it explains investors’ love for
ambiguity in recessionary times and dislike for ambiguity in favourable times. It also
predicts a higher ambiguity premium in directional and volatile markets although this is
not necessarily in evenly-keeled markets with equal up and down probability markets.
Other most related papers to this paper are Ghysels et al. (2009) and Epstein and
Schneider (2008). The paper similarly exploits the linear relationships amongst volatility
risks, ambiguity and asset prices in the earlier Ghysels and Epstein papers in the testing.
The paper is organised as follows. In the following section 2, a literature review on am-
biguity is first discussed. In section 3.1, the textual data set is introduced including how
the difference in opinions or disagreement is obtained from Natural Language Processing
(NLP). Its statistical properties are discussed in section 3.2. The binomial tree model to
model an agent’s behaviour under ambiguity is described in section 4 and the mixture of
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distributions to aggregate opinion scores is in section 4.2. An econometric study is in sec-
tion 5 with a discussion on the results and related events in the 2017-2019. A conclusion
on the paper follows with the paper key contributions.
2 Related Literature
In academic literature, ambiguity amongst investors is expressed generally as uncertainty
on either consumption, labour market or information quality (different opinions). Whilst
the characteristic risk aversion coefficient refers to agents’ dislike over the uncertain pay-
offs, ambiguity can be characterised as their fear of the unknown unknowns, where they
cannot perceive the uncertain probabilities instead.
Empirical literature in Baillon et al. (2018) has shown that ambiguity is a rich phe-
nomenon that is characterised by two main aspects - the well-known ambiguity aversion
and the degree of ambiguity, that is the perceived level of ambiguity. The first ambi-
guity (attitudes) aversion much like risk aversion is a characteristic of the agent. The
second concerns the information quality and content, and captures the agent’s insensitiv-
ity towards prior likelihood changes. When the perceived level of ambiguity is high (for
example due to very poor information quality), the less the decision maker is able to dis-
tinguish the blurred likelihoods which are then treated as alike. In non-technical terms,
too much information (noise) can be no information at all. Both aspects are instrumen-
tal in impacting the financial markets, although this paper studies more at the perceived
level of ambiguity.
Notably, there was a lack of empirical data in the papers by Epstein and Schneider
(2008) and Veronesi (2000) to measure ambiguity. Papers resort to controlled laboratory
experiments like choosing urns in the Ellesberg’s paradox to quantify ambiguity. The
Brenner and Izhakian (2018) paper built an ambiguity measurement by converting high
frequency minute price data to lower frequency ambiguity measurement. It documented
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several empirical evidences of ambiguity on asset pricing that are replicated with textual
data in this paper.
Another paper argued the variance premium to be largely explained by ambiguity
aversion Miao et al. (2019). The variance premium is the difference between the risk-
neutral and objective expectations of market return variance and results from ambiguity
due to compounding effect of market uncertainty. This variance premium largely corre-
lates positively to recessionary periods, which is a similar result of the ambiguity mea-
surement found in this paper.
Ghysels et al. (2009) uses a beta-weighted variance of forecasts of professional fore-
casters to measure disagreement and used it to proxy ambiguity directly. Ghysels et al
recognised that disagreement does not equal ambiguity except under certain conditions.
This paper uses a mixture of distributions for the financial news and social media distri-
butions to distinguish between disagreement and ambiguity. Ghysels et al further used
several combinations of linear regressions that include volatility risks and uncertainties
in the trade-off against returns. This was for the period 1969 to 2003, when the use of
Internet was not yet popular. It found a stronger relationship for the uncertainty returns
trade-off than the volatility returns trade-off. This is a similar empirical result with our
empirical tests using textual data from 1998 to 2019.
3 Financial News and Social Media
3.1 Text as Data
Text as data has gained popularity in the literature. Unlike tangible information which
lends itself to econometric analysis, textual data is quantified through features and classi-
fied using machine learning into different bins. Prose unlike quantitative data lends itself
to subjective and ambiguous interpretation amongst different readers. For example the
Wall Street Journal headline on 28 Feb 2019 reads:
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Fed Chief Says U.S. Economy ’Is in a Good Place’.
Jerome Powell said the U.S. economy is doing well, but he highlighted risks to growth that prompted
the central bank to signal it is done raising interest rates for now.
The ambiguity from text comes not only from within the prose, but also from mixed re-
views and opinions that are published by different authors which are propagated through
the social media and financial news media. Recent academic literature had showed both
the social media and the financial news media to have important impacts on the equity
markets.
In the social media, the tone of Twitter posts were found to predate stock price move-
ments in Bollen et al. (2011). The volume of Internet search words from millions of house-
holds was used in Da et al. (2015) to construct a sentiment index that was found to predict
stock price movements and volatility. Over the last decade, social media has evolved to
leverage on budding retail investors’ interest. Chen et al. (2014) found that the posts from
the popular social media investing site, SeekingAlpha.com predict future stock returns
and earnings.
The financial news media has been found to impact the financial markets too. In Tet-
lock (2007), the proportion of pessimistic words on a popular Wall Street Journal column
was found to predict downward pressure on market prices. A more recent article by
Heston and Sinha (2017) studied 900,000 news stories and found that its sentiment pre-
dicts short-term returns, with positive news increasing stock returns quickly and negative
news receiving a long-delayed reaction.
Recent research in Kelly et al. (2017) quantifies text as data through a count of the
relevant words that appear in articles. I used textual data from Thomson Reuters Mar-
ketPsych indices (TRMI), which is a global standard for textual mining in financial mar-
kets. TRMI uses a proprietary reference bible of labelled positive or negative words and
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semantic inference rules to quantify textual content for opinion scores. Its methodology is
similar to the Loughran and McDonald (2011) which uses the General Inquirer database.
TRMI sources are however more extensive coming from 2000 news and 800 social media
platforms around the world.5 The TRMI opinion scores range from -1.0 to 1.0, and is daily
aggregated from the different media websites.
Two different types of TRMI indices are used in this study - the financial news me-
dia and social media posts. The financial news media sources include for example, the
Wall Street Journal, MarketWatch and the Financial Times while the social media sources
include Facebook, Twitter, SeekingAlpha and etc. The news media sources are gener-
ally more objective and factual reporting on fundamentals regarding the economy and
companies. They are perceived more trustworthy compared to social media posts.6
3.2 Statistical properties of text data
The histogram of the monthly opinion scores and the statistical properties of the news and
social media opinion scores for the S&P 500 index are in figures 1a and 1b respectively.
Notably, the opinion scores in social media relative to news media opinion scores tend to
be in unison with a smaller standard deviation than the scores from the news media. This
hints of a herding effect amongst household investors Nofsinger and Wias (1999). The
bimodal distribution of the social media opinion scores indicates the household investors
rather post extreme positive or negative comments than neutral comments. The relatively
positive skewness indicates a higher tendency to post more positive posts. This contrasts
with the relative negative skewness from the financial news media. An interesting article
from the Brookings institute writes that bad news sell. Psychology shows that readers
5Some literature especially in the computer science domain uses sentiment to mean opinion. To avoid
confusion with market sentiment, this paper uses opinion but whether sentiment or opinion, the idea of
different opinionation and ambiguity is true.
6The journalists from these mainstream news follow a strict code of ethics that strives to ensure the free
exchange of information that is accurate, fair and thorough. See the Society of Professional Journalism
website.
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are drawn to bad news without realising it. Let the suffixes [m, n] denote social media
and news media scores henceforth respectively. The monthly correlations from 1998 Jan
to 2019 Mar amongst the opinion scores and with the S&P 500 returns are ρ(sm, sn) = 0.25,
ρ(rs&p, sm) = 0.23 and ρ(rs&p, sn) = 0.21. A time series of the opinion scores of the social
media and financial news media, and the difference in their scores - disagreement is in
figure 2. Generally, the social media opinion scores have been more negative than the
news media especially since the last recession in 2008.
(a) Distribution of news media opinion scores (b) Distribution of social media opinion scores
Figure 1: Histograms of opinion scores from social media and news media










Table 1: Statistical properties of social media and news media opinion scores
The table shows the statistical properties of the monthly opinion scores on the S&P 500 index by the financial news media and the
social media from 1998 Jan to 2019 March. Total number of data points is 255.
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There is a general trend of greater negativism in the social media relative to the news media post
the Lehman crisis. This corresponds to a larger disagreement between the two information sources
as well. In the 2017 to 2019, there is lesser disagreement. A speculative reason is the growing global
counter actions and concern against misinformation since 2017. For example the United States
in 2017 required the social media giants Facebook, Twitter and Google to testify on their roles in
spreading misinformation. The European Union crafted a policy report on disinformation in 2018.
Figure 2: Time Series of opinion scores and disagreement in the global media on the S&P
500 index from Thomson Reuters MarketPsych
4 Ambiguity Model of Utility
4.1 Binomial Tree model of ambiguity
I next use a binomial tree based model to model a representative agent’s behaviour under
ambiguity. The model is able to capture the salient features of ambiguity in asset pricing
both in this paper and Brenner and Izhakian (2018).
Consider an economy with a single risky asset with an initial price of P0 = 1 at time
t = 0. Two or more sources (denote as m, n) provide news that impact future cash flows
arrive at t = 0. There is a representative agent that receives an ambiguous signal s with
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smooth ambiguity preferences as in Kilbanoff et al. (2005) of a double exponential form.








The f is a real valued function that denotes the agent’s plan of action. He chooses to
either act on the news from source m or n, or combine a mixture of the sources on the
probability measure π that is on S. Each of this news source is ambiguous in nature.
Assume the agent has a risk neutral utility function u( f ).7 φ is a second order mapping
of the probability on the action f . The possible φ states are over ε between 1 − p >
ε > −p with ε as the uncertainty adjustment on the higher payoff U completing the
probability space. Consider a binomial case where the cashflows become either U with
true probability p + ε or D with probability 1− p − ε at t = 1 for U > D. The ε is due
to the ambiguity of the signal from textual news and different information sources as
perceived by the agent. The ε is similar to the case of posterior parameter uncertainty cited
in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Coles et al. (1995) in that it impacts both the mean
and variance of the future cashflows perceived by the agent. The preferences function of
the agent reduces to:





(p + ε)U + (1− p− ε)D
]
dε (2)
In the case of ambiguity neutrality, φ is linear which will reduce to the standard asset
pricing model. For the case of ambiguity aversion, following the ambiguity measurement
in Brenner and Izhakian (2018), I use a second order probability functional form as f2[r] =∫
E[φ(r)]Var[φ(r)]d f . This variance of the probability has been used much in literature to
express uncertainty for example in the exercise of employee stock options Izhakian and
Yermack (2017) and capital structure in Izhakian et al. (2017). The agent expected present
7In the case of risk aversion, there would be an additional probability adjustment to risk neutral prob-
abilities. However this would unnecessarily complicate matters with the need for market completeness
when the primary point of this model is to illustrate the price adjustment due to ambiguity alone.
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utility Ut(ε) ex-post the ambiguious news arrival now becomes in equation 3. This can be
represented pictorially in the tree diagram of figure 3.
Ut(ε) = Et[U ∗ (p + ε)2 + D ∗ (1− p− ε)2] (3)
P′0
D













Figure 3: Tree based model of smooth ambiguity
The left diagram in the figure 3 shows a standard asset pricing case (or ambiguity neu-
tral case) where the price P′0 moves up to U with probability p + ε and D with probability
1− p− ε at time t = 1. The right diagram is a consequence of the agent’s utility function
in equation 3. Instead of weighing the uncertain payoffs by their probabilities, the agent
weighs the uncertain probabilities by their payoffs instead. The economic intuition is the
agent weighs the importance of their particular beliefs (or probabilities in this context)
by its associated payoff. The market is efficient and the asset price changes immediately
to the ex-post fair price P′0 after the arrival of news from the information sources. This
ex-post fair price P′0 is given by equation 5 which is the expectations of the payoffs in time
t = 1 considering information ambiguity ε. There is only one representative agent in the
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market for clearing prices.
P′0 = (p + ε) ∗U + (1− p− ε) ∗ D (4)
= p ∗U + (1− p) ∗ D︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected dri f t
+ ε ∗ (U − D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ambiguity adjustment
(5)
This ambiguity adjustment has the useful property of mean-preserving spreads in
probabilities analogous to Rothschild-Stiglitz’s risk attitude towards mean preserving
spreads in outcomes. The agent reacts to the uncertainty by minimising his utility Ut(ε)
by solving on his subjective uncertainty ε.8 This is similar to max-min optimisation and
is the limiting case of the smooth ambiguity model by Kilbanoff et al. This is done by
setting ∂Ut(ε)∂ε = (p + ε) ∗U − (1− p− ε) ∗ D = 0. Solving for ε results in equation 6.
ε =
1− p(U + D)
U + D
(6)
The equation 6 expresses the uncertainty ε as a function of p. This is an empirical con-
clusion in Brenner and Izhakian (2018), whence ambiguity is contingent on the expected
probability of favourable returns. A higher p reduces the ε perceived by the agent. In-
tuitively, this means with favourable probabilities for higher returns, the agent becomes
more ambiguity averse and allocates a smaller ε to the higher returns scenario. In the op-
posite case of an unfavourable scenario or ’down’ markets, the agents becomes ambiguity
loving which results in a higher probability p value and an increased ε.














Further, the derivative ∂P
′
0
∂ε = U − D > 0. This positive derivative means that as uncer-
8See Gilboa and Marinacci (2013) for an excellent treatise on the history of subjective probabilities and
why Bayesian probabilities are not necessarily more rational in an ambiguous setting.
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tainty ε increases, the price P′0 increases. This reduces future returns, so that expected
returns ∂rt∂ε < 0. This is consistent with the empirical results later in the paper where the
coefficients of the returns to ambiguity measures are all negative. This is a same result in
table 4 of Brenner and Izhakian (2018).
prob = p + ε
P′0 prob = 1− p + ε
U
D
P′0 prob = p + ε
prob = 1− p + ε
U
D
Figure 4: Ambiguity premium ∆P′0 < 0 in upwards and discount ∆P
′
0 > 0 in downwards
markets
Some typical values are applied to the tree model equations 6 and 7 and illustrated
in figure 4. Suppose p = 0.6, U = 1.10 and D = 1.05. In this case, ε = −0.135 and
P′0 = 1.073. Without ambiguity, P
′
0 = 1.08 marking an ambiguity discount of 0.007. Note
this represents favourable probability since p > 0.5 on the higher payoff, and implies the
agents’ ambiguity averse behaviour (since ε < 0).9 Suppose now instead an unfavourable
probability on the higher payoff where p = 0.4, U = 0.95 and D = 0.85. In this case,
ε = 0.155 and P′0 = 0.905. Without ambiguity, P
′
0 = 0.89 marking an ambiguity premium
9Whilst it is not the intent of this paper, the results are consistent with the empirical studies linking
ambiguity aversion and over-confidence. In this model, over-confidence occurs when the agent places a
higher than objective probability p weight on the larger cashflow U in the favourable scenario. Brenner
et al. (2015) found in an experimental study that ambiguity has a negative impact on overconfidence. This
is evidenced in the model with ε < 0 for the favourable cashflow scenario U. Overconfidence has been
attributed in literature to two main causes - agents’ ability and ambiguity. The modelling of over-confidence
and ambiguity in this manner however is flimsy since it is based on a single parameter ε.
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of 0.015, implying the agent’s ambiguity loving behaviour since the agent is willing to
pay more with ambiguity.
I further use this model to make predictions. Firstly, when the probability p = 0.5,
the ambiguity premium becomes less significant, especially if the up and down price
movements offset each other. This happens for example when U = 1.1 and D = 0.9
and the ambiguity premium is actually zero. This makes intuitive sense since any risk
the agent perceives in such an evenly keeled market is allocated as the risk premium.
This evenly-keeled market is applicable even for large U − D, say U = 1.5 and D = 0.5.
This implication means that even in a very volatile market but the odds are even, the
ambiguity premium can be still zero. Mathematically, the Intermediate value theorem
states for a continuous function f (x) with an interval [a, b] that takes values f (a) and f (b)
it must also take any value between f (a) and f (b), which in this particular case implies
the ambiguity premium/ discount must take on the value of zero.
On the contrary, the ambiguity premium is large when the expected movement dif-
ferences U − D are large, and they are moving in the same direction. This happens for
example when U = 1.2 and D = 1.1 or U = 0.9 and D = 0.8. Naturally this also implies
that the ambiguity premium will be greater in directional and more volatile markets (for
large U − D). There is evidence in Ghysels et al. (2009), Miao et al. (2019) and in figure 8
of this paper when the ambiguity index is shown to be the highest prior and during the
recessionary times.
The model offers a natural explanation for the significance of the ambiguity premium
during recessionary times and not in expansionary times since it depends directly on the
U − D, which is a proxy for the dispersion or volatility of the returns. This is due to the
asymmetrical volatility in markets cited in Bekaert and Wu (2000) which makes the con-
ditional variance of returns correlates negatively with returns in the presence of negative
news. When returns decreases in recessionary times, the volatility increases with the am-
biguity premium increasing consequentially. On the contrary when returns are high in
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expansionary times, volatility does not move as much due to assymmetric volatility with
the consequential ambiguity premium being much less. The model further inherits sev-
eral useful features of the smooth ambiguity model in that it dissects amongst ambiguity
aversion (second order probability functional form), perceived information ambiguity (ε)
and risk aversion (neutrality in this example).
4.2 Mixture of distributions hypothesis for ambiguous sources of in-
formation
The previous binomial tree model illustrates how a representative agent behaves under
ambiguity. I further use the mixture of distributions model to aggregate different infor-
mation sources and their signals si,t the agent receives. The mixture of distributions has
similarly been used in determining the empirical density of option prices reflecting the
beliefs distribution of different market agents. See Bahra (1997). Consider now the signal
at time t for i ∈ {m, n} in equation 8 on the dividend rate dt:
si,t =dt + εi,t εi,t ∼ N(0, σ2i ) (8)
I test both the news media and social media on their signals si,t individually to determine
which is more important in impacting ambiguity. The monthly level of ambiguity is cal-
culated by using the means and standard deviations of the daily signals that are assumed
normal. This conversion from high to low frequency approach has been used in Brenner
and Izhakian (2018) where 5 minute data is used to construct daily distributions which in
turn is used to construct the monthly ambiguity. In this case, the daily distributions are
used to derive the moments of the monthly distributions in equation 10 described below.
The agent forms prior beliefs from either sn or sm or a mixture of them based on a
mixture of distributions from these sources. Ignoring the time subscripts for notational
simplicity, the first and second moments for the mixture of k distributions are derived
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from Fruhwirth-Schnatter (2006). The ω in equation 10 represents the mixing parameter
or weight placed on the signal sn and 1− ω on the signal sm and thence determines the












i )− s2ψ (10)
In the case of the financial news media and social media for k = 2 this is represented
in equations 11 and 12 respectively. Similarly, higher moments like the skewness and
kurtosis for the ambiguity can be computed but are ignored in this study. The second
moment σψ represents the perceived level of ambiguity from the information sources.





n) + (1−ω)(s2m + σ2m)− s2ψ second moment (12)
The use of the mixture of distribution as compared to a convoluted bivariate distributions
is appropriate since a convoluted distribution would have reduced the dispersion of the
probabilities distribution (and thence ambiguity). Empirically, this would not be correct
since with a greater number of competing information sources, the greater the ambiguity
would be. Let Φ denote the difference between the two opinion scores in equation 13.
This represents the disagreement between the two sources.








Figure 5: Greater disagreement Φ2 > Φ1 increases ambiguity
The figures show the distributions of two information signals which means are very different. Φ represents the disagreement with
Φ2 > Φ1 such that the dispersion in the mixed distribution on the right hand side is larger with greater ambiguity.
Rationally, a greater disagreement between the two signals would result in greater
ambiguity. Suppose ω = 0.5 such that the two signals are equally weighted. Thence,
sψ = 0.5(sm + sn) and the second moment in equation 12 would reduce to equation 14
where the cross term 0.25sm,tsn,t is negligible.
σ2ψ =0.25Φ
2 + 0.25sm,tsn,t + 0.5(σ2n + σ
2
m)
≈0.25Φ2 + 0.5(σ2n + σ2m) (14)
An increase in disagreement Φ thence increases the level of ambiguity. Further, informa-
tion sources with ’large’ uncertainty σφ,i increase the ambiguity, especially if it has greater
mixing weight ωi. Intuitively, this can happen if a rumour spreads widely amongst the
community, the agent ’believes’ it with a greater weight ωi on it for decision-making. The
ω could also be optimised by the agent endogenously to reduce decision making uncer-








Figure 6: Larger individual information uncertainty σφ,i increases ambiguity
The figures show the distributions of two information signals with different standard deviations (σφ,2 > σφ,1) such that the ambiguity
on the right hand side would also be greater.
Using these measures, an index of the ambiguity scores for the financial news media,
social media and from their mixture disagreement are constructed as time series in figure
7 below. The ambiguity from the mixture disagreement sources and the financial news
media are notably higher than the social media. This can be attributed to the tendency of
social media posts being worded less ambiguous (smaller standard deviation of opinion
scores as noted in section 3.2.
Figure 7: Time Series of ambiguity index from global media on the S&P 500 index
18
5 Econometric Study
In both Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Ghysels et al. (2009), the returns is derived as a
function of the volatility and the degree of ambiguity σφ in equation 15.
p0(s) = E[d|s] = m + γψsψ + ρσd + θσψ (15)
This is similar to the equation 5, with the expected drift term as m + γψsψ and the ambi-
guity premium as the θσψ. Define γi =
cov(si ,ri)
var(si)
as the regression coefficient of the return r
against the individual signal si. Thus γi represents the useful signal to noise ratio of the
signal si and represents the reliability of the signal. In the empirical section 5.1, it repre-
sents the coefficient of the information signal si ∀ i ∈ {m, n}. A high value represents the
usefulness of the signal but not necessarily the ambiguity of the signal, which would be
represented by its individual σφ,i.10
I test various hypothetical scenarios by OLS regressions on the S&P 500 returns using
combinations of variables. The regression results are in table 2.11
5.1 Empirical discussion
The model numbers 1 to 3 in table 2 test hypotheses whence the agent observes the opin-
ion score signal individually. The individual opinion score from the financial news sn has
a marginally higher explanatory power than the social media score sm. A latest survey by
Pew center in December 2018 showed that social media still falls behind news websites
as a source of information. There is evidence that the agent considers both signals as snm
10A useful illustration is that of an obtrusive lie. The obtrusiveness of it makes it less ambiguous but as a
lie it is simply unreliable.
11In the empirical study, the GARCH(1,1) is used to model the S&P 500 voatility. The equations for the
returns and the conditional variance σd,t are in 16 and 17 respectively.
rt =εt εt ∼ N(0, σt) (16)




t Garch equation (17)
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which is the equally weighted (ω = 0.5) average of the signals sn and sm has the high-
est log-likelihood. A counter-intuitive observation is the higher γm for the social media
which indicates it as having a higher signal to noise ratio. This may be attributed to the
lower standard deviation of the social media scores as discussed earlier, and also to social
media being a propagator of largely stale news in Tetlock (2011). This means investors
react to repeated social media information as though they are new. There is similar ev-
idence in Jiao et al. which found that social media acts as ’echo chambers’ of existing
information.
Model numbers 4 to 6 add the individual ambiguity σψ,i to the opinion scores for the
regression. The inclusion of the ambiguity measurements in all cases provide a better
fit. All coefficients of the ambiguity measurements are negative as predicted by the tree-
based model. The most probable hypothesis is model 6 with the equal average of both
the social media and financial news media scores.
In Model number 7, the returns are regressed against the S&P volatility, σd. The co-
efficient is found to be statistically insignificant - the same puzzling relation between in-
tertemporal risk and return cited in Scruggs (2002) and Campbell (1999). This was at-
tributed in Veronesi (2000) to the opposite effects of ambiguous information. On one
hand, a negative news signal that increases volatility depresses casflow expectations but
it also increase hedging demand due to agents’ risk aversion over the poor information
quality. The aggregate impact on the returns from the increase in the volaility is there-
fore insignificant and even negative. Model number 8 considers this ambiguity-returns
trade-off instead of the risk-returns trade-off. The ambiguity-returns is more significant
substantiating Ghysels et al’s finding although in both Model 7 and 8, the coefficients are
not statistically significant.
However when the σd is regressed with the signals from the financial news, social
media and both the media in model no 9, 10 and 11 respectively, the coefficients becomes
positive and significant - a similar finding with Brenner and Izhakian (2018).
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The Models 12 to 14 test all three variables simultaneously to ascertain which has
the best fit. The most probable model is 14 with the ambiguity from the disagreement
between the social media and financial news media scores and the average of the opinion
scores. Model 15 with the agent choosing snsm as the minimum of the two opinion scores
shows the best fit model, indicating there is some form of agent optimising behaviour
towards ambiguity. It is important to realise that the mixture of distributions in itself does
not offer an explanation for how the agent optimises his utility with ambiguity (aversion).
Instead, it offers an avenue for the agent to weigh and aggregate his beliefs by choosing
ω to reduce his perceived uncertainty.
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5.2 Empirical results
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
sn 0.21 0.17 0.30 0.26
(3.42) (2.64) (4.66) (3.84)
sm 0.354 0.419 0.450 0.502
(2.82) (3.19) (3.58) (3.82)
snm 0.323 0.319 0.470 0.489
(3.48) (3.58) (4.47) (4.96)
snsm 0.509
4.35




σψ,nm -8.17 -8.72 -12.0
(-1.81) (-1.57) (-2.79)
σd 0.129 0.623 0.457 0.692 0.598 0.423 0.811 0.854
(0.45) (2.34) (1.858) (2.64) (2.26) (1.70) 3.07 (2.96)
c 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(4.22) (5.09) (5.38) (3.50) (4.67) (4.29) (-0.01) (2.48) (-1.42) (-0.14) (-1.22) (-0.41) (0.73) (-0.36 (-0.36)
Adjusted
R2
0.052 0.045 0.062 0.061 0.057 0.069 -0.002 0.009 0.081 0.061 0.098 0.088 0.070 0.118 0.119
Log-
likelihood
438.3 437.4 439.7 440.1 439.6 441.2 429.1 432.7 442.9 440.0 445.2 444.3 441.9 448.6 448.7
The dependent variable is the monthly excess S&P 500 returns. The terms in brackets are the t-stats that are Newey-West adjusted. Most coefficient are significant at the 5%
confidence level. The log-likelihood values in bold for models no 14 and 15 refer to the best hypothesis model. The regression period is for the period 1998 Jan to 2019 March for 255
monthly data points.
Table 2: OLS Regression hypothesis results
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5.3 Agent’s behaviour under ambiguity
The result from the last section regression - snsm for Model no 15 hints of the agent reacting
towards ambiguity by being more conservative similar to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
maxmin utility behaviour. To test this behaviour, two specification regressions are further
done in table 3.
In the first specification, the Model numbers 1 to 7 vary the ω from 0 to 1. The Model
number 5 and 6 with ω ≈ 0.55 shows the highest likelihood fit, highlighting the relative
importance of the financial news media to the social media in impacting asset prices.
The last column ’Min’ is similar to smsn but dynamically adjusts the weight ωi,t = 1 to
correspond to the minimum (most pessimistic) opinion score signal si,t at each month.
Model No (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ω mixing pa-
rameter
0.0 0.25 0.5 0.55 0.75 0.80 1.0 Min
sns 0.502 0.549 0.489 0.468 0.368 0.341 0.256 0.502
(3.82) (4.54) (4.96) (5) (4.90) (4.77) (3.84) (4.75)
σψ -28.42 -14.49 -12.03 -12.04 -12.42 -12.37 -8.40 -5.27
(-1.81) (-2.21) (-2.79) (-2.87) (-2.87) (-2.76) (-1.73) (-1.66)
σd 0.423 0.722 0.809 0.81 0.757 0.730 0.598 0.903
(1.70) (2.82) (3.07) (3.06) (2.89) (2.80) (2.25) (3.32)
c 0.0089 0.00072 -0.0036 -0.0037 -0.0031 -0.0027 -0.0052 -0.0089
(0.731) (0.071) (-0.362) (-0.38) (-0.294) (-0.257) (-0.414) (-0.875)
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.10 0.118 0.118 0.112 0.109 0.088 0.12
Log-likelihood 441.8 446.8 448.62 448.64 447.7 447.3 444.3 448.8
The dependent variable is the monthly excess S&P 500 returns. The terms in brackets are the t-stats that are Newey-West adjusted.
Most coefficients are significant at the 5% confidence level.
Table 3: Testing relative importance of financial to social media news
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Figure 8: Different ambiguity index based on ω
The dotted line is for the dynamically weighted
ω with the most pessimistic belief si,t in a
maxmin-like utility optimisation.
Figure 9: Likelihood values for different mixing parameters ω
The figure 8 shows a time series of different ambiguity indices with ω = 0.55 with
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the most optimal likelihood and for the dynamically weighted ω. Interestingly, both the
ambiguity indices concur with the ambiguity index cited in Izahakian et al in a Dec 2017
WSJ article. In the article, the ambiguity index constructed from market data hit historical
highs in 2017 in spite of the (CBOE) volatility index being at contradictorily low levels.
An examination of the figure 2 shows the ambiguity is caused more due to the uncertainty
of both the social media and financial news media sources and less by the disagreement
of these two sources. Notwithstanding the high ambiguity index, this did not necessar-
ily translate to a high premium if the market odds are evenly-keeled. In such markets,
investors exhibit portfolio inertia not knowing what to do either way in the face of uncer-
tainty. This is consistent with the conclusion in Illeditsch (2011) and Ameriks and Zeldes
(2000) which documented that investors do not trade much on surprising news.
The figure 9 shows the log-likelihood being plotted against the different ω. The red
line is for the dynamically weighted strategy showing it with the highest log-likelihood.
This suggests that the agent is more likely to follow the most pessimistic opinion score
with its associated ambiguity. Observing the figure 2 for the time series of the different
media opinion scores shows that there are long periods that the social media score is more
pessimistic than the financial news score from Jun 2009 to Nov 2016. During this period,
the agent would be following the social opinion scores with ωm = 1. This behaviour is
especially so during this Lehman crisis and Greek debt crisis but less during the earlier
dot-com bust in the early 2000s. This observation suggests the increased importance of
the social media in influencing asset prices news during recent economic crises. However,
notwithstanding the higher ωn ≈ 0.55 on the financial news media indicates its greater
importance in influencing asset prices. It is likely that there are agents in the market that
follow both strategies.
The relative importance of the financial news media becomes greater however when
weekend news is used to construct the ambiguity index12 with the optimal ω ≈ 0.7. The
12A separate set of regressions is performed on the opnion scores considering non-trading days as well.
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peaks in the time series of ambiguity index derived from the agent’s minmax optimal
actions also correspond distinctly to the recessionary episodes of the Lehman crisis in
2008 and the September 11 incident.
6 Conclusion
The paper makes a few key contributions. The first is it offers a natural Big Data and natu-
ral event method to measure an ambiguity adjustment through millions of actual textual
posts in social and news media. The second key contribution is it proposes a binomial
tree model of ambiguity based on the smooth ambiguity that models a representative
agent’s minimising behaviour to his perceived risks by controlling for information un-
certainty. The model is able to explain salient features of investors’ love for ambiguity
during the recessionary times, and dislike for ambiguity during booming times, and also
the higher value of the ambiguity premium during directional markets. Using a mix-
ture of distributions model, the opinion scores from the financial and social media are
also aggregated and an ambiguity index is formed. This ambiguity is distinct from dis-
agreement although it is directly proportional to its square. It is also influenced by the
individual information source uncertainty. The mixture of distributions model allows to
test the relative importance of the social media and financial media news by varying its
mixing weight parameter. In general, there is a higher weight on the importance of the
financial news media∼ 0.55. However in recent times, especially during the Lehman and
Greek debt crisis, the social media has affected asset prices greater. This importance could
have resulted from the generally negativism of the social media during the recessionary
periods and the maxmin utility behaviour of investor agent actions. The paper also offers
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